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The Proposed Federal Criminal Code:
An Unwarranted Expansion in Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction
INTRODUCTION
Since 1966 Congress has been considering the idea of major fed-
eral criminal law reform.' The most recent proposal for reform and
revision of Title 18 of the United States Code is the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code,2 which has been described as "the most important at-
tempt in 200 years to reorganize and streamline the administration of
federal criminal justice."3 As part of its overhaul of the federal crim-
inal laws, the Proposed Code contains new and startling expansions
of federal jurisdiction-the power of the federal government to define
and punish criminal activity-over what has previously been considered
"intrastate" crime. Noticeable conceptual and structural changes in
federal criminal jurisdiction highlight the increase in jurisdiction in the
Proposed Code. Although there is some doubt whether the Proposed
Code will be enacted into law, 4 because of the considerable contro-
versy engendered by this proposal and its status as, at least, a tenta-
tive statement of federal policy, it is fruitful to analyze the jurisdic-
tional framework of the Proposed Code.
This Note will examine the need for, the wisdom, and the
effectiveness of the jurisdictional approach and policy of the Proposed
1. See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, 2s amended bh Act of July 8,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44. This Act provided for the establishment of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws and required the Commission to submit a final
report within four years. This Final Report has served as a work basis for legislative proposals
on reform, revision, and codification of federal criminal law. See FINAL REPORT OF TIl
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1971) [hereinafter cited
as FINAL REPORT].
2. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Code],
3. 123 CONG. REc. 56838 (daily ed. May 2, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy), The Pro-
posed Code, supra note 2, is the most recent attempt to establish a new, comprehensive federal
criminal code and has its genesis in the work of the National Commission. Earlier attempts at
reform included S. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in the 94th Congress did not act on these previous proposals
because of controversy surrounding a number of issues in them. The current Proposed Code,
S. 1437, "is the result of efforts to identify and resolve in a spirit of give and take the conflicting
views that surfaced in the previous Congress." SENATE CONMI. ON TIE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL
CODE REFORM ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977) [herein-
after cited as SENATE REPORT].
4. The Proposed Code has passed the full Senate but has run into stiff opposition in the
House. At the time this article goes to press the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary has indicated it will not act favo-ably on the Senate Bill, but
will propose piecemeal reform as an alternative. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1978, at 10, cot. 3-4
(city ed.).
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Federal Criminal Code. In order to place the Proposed Codes juris-
dictional framework in its proper historical perspective, the historical
development of federal criminal jurisdiction will be emphasized. Part
I will briefly sketch the early development of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion in the context of the principles of American federalism. Part II
will discuss modem developments in federal criminal jurisdiction and,
in particular, the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction under the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Finally, Part III
will describe and evaluate the treatment of jurisdiction in the Proposed
Code.
I. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
A. The Formative Years: Protecting Exclusively
Federal Governmental Interests5
The federal government is one of enumerated powers, 6 and ac-
cordingly, it has no general power to punish crime.7  Under the Con-
stitution, "[t]he power to define crimes belongs to Congress only as
an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited grant of
legislative powers."'  In accordance with the basic federalist precept
that "t]he powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined," 9 the first federal criminal laws were
limited in jurisdictional scope. The only constitutional provisions that
specifically authorize federal jurisdiction over criminal activities em-
power Congress:
(1) To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States; °
(2) To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations;"
(3) To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of par-
ticular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of
government of the United States, and to exercise like authority
5. See generally Boudin, The Place of the Anti-Racketeering Act in Our Constitutional-
Legal System, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 264-68 (1943); McClellan, Codification. Reform and Revi-
sion: The Challenge of a Modem Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DuKE LJ. 663, 672-85; Schwartz,
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw & CoN'msm. PRoa. 64, 64-66
(1948).
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
7. Boudin, supra note 5, at 262. See THE FEDERALiST No. 45 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed.
1961).
8. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
9. THE FEDERALiST No. 45, at 328 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
10. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
11. Id. art. I,§8, cl. 10.
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over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the
states in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, maga-
zines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;12 [and]
(4) To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life
of the person attained.
3
The Federalist Papers suggested that the power to protect the
general welfare through the exercise of police powers was to remain
with the states. Madison explained that in the federal system the
"powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and prop-
erties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosper-
ity of the State."' 4  Similarly, Hamilton pointed out that "the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they before had, and which were not, by that act [of union] exclusiveh,
delegated to the United States."' 5 These principles of American fed-
eralism, therefore, conceived of a limited federal presence in American
society. The powers of the federal government were to be those that
a nation-state would normally exercise-the power to make treaties,
declare war, collect revenue, and regulate trade. The general power
to define and punish criminal activity, however, was to remain the
province of the states.
In accordance with the principles of federalism the early federal
criminal laws prohibited only conduct directed against the federal
government or affecting exclusively federal governmental functions.
The first federal criminal statute was enacted in 1789 to punish cus-
toms fraud and bribing or "conniving" federal customs officers. 6 In
1790 Congress passed "An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
against the United States."'17 This statute dealt with offenses against
the federal government (e.g., treason and misprision of treason),
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, direct interferences
with the federal court system (e.g., perjury in federal court), counter-
feiting, and murder or manslaughter within a federal enclave such as
12. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
13. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. In addition, the Constitution defines treason: "Treason against
the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or, in adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of
two witnesses of the same overt act, or on confession in open court." U.S. CONST, art, Ill, § 3 cl. ,
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 328 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original). See U.S. CoNsT. amend X. ("The powers not delegated :.o the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.")
16. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 34-35, 1 Stat. 29 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
17. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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a fort or arsenal belonging to the United States. t8 All of the crimes
proscribed were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
and each proscription was directly dependent upon a specific provision
in the Constitution.19
The limited number of crimes specified in the 1790 Act gave rise
to an inference that other crimes committed within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the United States, such as arson or robbery within the
compound of a federal fort, federal building or on the high seas, could
not be punished. 20  This inference was buttressed in the 1812 case of
United States v. Hudson,2' in which the Supreme Court held that the
circuit courts of the United States could not exercise a common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases. Under Hudson, in order for the federal
courts to have jurisdiction over an offense, "[t]he legislative authority
of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it,
and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense."22
Four years later, in the case of United States v. Coolidge, 3 the prin-
ciple of Hudson was further strengthened when the Attorney General de-
24clined to argue that same issue. Under the rule of these two cases,
an offense committed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States was punishable only under a federal statute proscribing the par-
ticular conduct.
In 1825 Congress increased the number of offenses that were pun-
ishable if committed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.25  In addition, the definition "high seas" was broadened to in-
clude offenses committed on an American ship "while lying in a port or
place within the jurisdiction of any foreign state or sovereign."26 The
concluding section of the act provided, however, that "nothing in this
act contained shall be construed to deprive the courts of the individual
18. Id. §§ 1-7.
19. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra. The inclusion of crimes affecting the federal
court system was necessary and proper to the establishment of an effective federal court system.
See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
20. See McClellan, supra note 5, at 674-75.
21. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32(1812).
22. Id. at 33-34.
23. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
24. Justice Story, however, did not take the question whether federal courts had jurisdiction
at common law of offenses against the United States to be settled by Hudson. United States v.
Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat,) 415, 416 (1816). See generally I C. W ARRE.N, TIlE SuPMIE
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 433-40 (1922).
25. See Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, §§ 1-26, 4 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.). The Act punished such crimes as arson in a federal enclave, or "other needful build-
ing belonging to the United States," arson or rape on the high seas, plunder of a vessel in dis-
tress, extortion by a federal officer, theft by an employee of the Bank of the United States, and
forgery of treasury notes or coins. Id. §§ 1, 2, 4-9, 12, 16, 17, 20.
26. Id. § 5. See McClellan supra note 5, at 676.
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states, of jurisdiction, under the laws of the several states, over offences
made punishable by this act.
27
B. The First Stages of Growth: Mail Fraud, Lotteries,
and the White Slave Traffic
From 1825 until the Reconstruction period the scope of federal
criminal jurisdiction was not increased. 2' Expansion occurred in
1872, when Congress criminalized the use of the mails as an instru-
mentality of fraud 29 and the sending of obscene literature through the
mails."' Both statutes derived their constitutional authority from
Congress' power to establish post offices and post roads and provide
for their regulation.31 In the 1877 case of United States v. Fox,32 the
Supreme Court defined the limits of federal jurisdiction over crime:
Such jurisdiction could not exist unless the offense had "some relation
to the execution of a power of Congress."" The postal provision was
"practically construed" that same year in Ex Parte Jackson"4 to give
Congress the power to regulate the entire postal system of the country
and to articulate what could be carried in the mail and what could
be excluded. The Court considered proper the congressional refusal
of the use of "its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed in-
jurious to the public morals"; 3 5 therefore, Congress possessed the
power to "forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that
it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme
or not."36  In this manner the exclusive federal power to regulate
the nation's postal system was used as a source of federal criminal
jurisdiction over conduct believed to violate public policy and morality.
The most significant jurisdictional development, however, oc-
curred at the turn of the century when the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce was held to include the power to pro-
hibit particular articles from entering the stream of commerce if
Congress found such articles or commodities to be harmful to the na-
27. Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 26, 4 Stat. 115.
28. See Boudin, supra note 5, at 266; McClellan, supra note 5, at 676.77; Schwartz,
supra note 5, at 65.
29. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)).
See Boudin, supra note 5, at 266.
30. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 283, as amended by Act of March 3, 1873,
ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 598 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976)). Federal legislation barring the
importation of indecent and obscene matter first appeared in 1842. See Tariff Act of 1842, ch.
270, § 28, 5 Stat. 548 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976)).
31. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
32. 95 U.S. 670 (1877).
33. Id. at 672. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
34. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
35. Id. at 736. See In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1891).
36. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916).
[Vol. 39:132
CRIMINAL CODE
tional interest. In this way Congress was able to exercise criminal
jurisdiction under the commerce clause. Such jurisdiction was to
prove to be potentially as broad as the commerce power itself. This
power to prohibit articles from entering the stream of commerce was
established in 1903 in the Lottery Case, 37 in which the Court sus-
tained Congress' power to prohibit the interstate transportation of lot-
tery tickets by invoking criminal sanctions against anyone shipping
lottery tickets interstate.38 In 1913, in Hoke v. United States,39 the
principle established in the Lottery Case was applied to the White
Slave Traffic Act,40 which prohibited the transportation of women for
immoral purposes across state lines.
The growth in federal jurisdiction over crime in these years,
however, was not viewed as an expansion into traditionally local areas
of law enforcement. Rather, both Congress and the Court conceived
of the type of federal statute at issue in the Lottery Case and Hoke as
police regulations in "a domain which the States cannot reach and
over which Congress alone has power.' 4 Both the Lottery Act and
the White Slave Traffic Act were enacted in response to problems that
were viewed as particularly national in character. 42  With the constitu-
tionality firmly established of federal criminal legislation based on the
power of Congress to prohibit the use of the mails and of the instru-
mentality of interstate commerce for unlawful purposes, the actual scope
of Congress' plenary commerce power as it applied to criminal legisla-
tion remained to be determined.
C. Early Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction Under
the Commerce Clause
37. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
38. The majority was careful to point out, however, that the federal statute was not inter-
fering with the substantive law of the states in this area. The Court construed the federal anti-
lottery statute as not interfering "with traffic or commerce in lottery tickets carried on exclu-
sively within the limits of any state, but [having] in view only commerce of that kind among the
several States." Id. at 357.
39. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
40. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, §§ 2-7,36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421 (1976)).
41. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321 (1913).
42. The legislative history of the Mann Act points out that it was not aimed at regulating
conduct over which the states had control:
The legislation is needed to put a stop to a villainous interstate and international traffic
in women and girls. The legislation is not needed or intended as an aid to the states in
the exercise of their police powers in the suppression or regulation of immorality in gen-
eral. It does not attempt to regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution, but aims
solely to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling thousands of women and
girls against their will and desire to enter and continue in a life of prostitution.
H. R. REP. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1909). The statute's application, however, soon
reached beyond commercialized vice, and federal prosecution of an accused for traveling with his
mistress from California to Nevada was held to be within the scope of the Mann Act in Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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1. The Meaning of Plenary Power
As early as 1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden,4 3 Chief Justice Marshall
defined commerce: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is some-
thing more-it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches. . ... 44
The power of Congress over that commerce "is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution. 4 5 Thus, Marshall con-
tinued, the sole restraints on which the people must rely to secure
them from the abuse of the commerce power are "[tihe wisdom and
the discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and the in-
fluence which their constituents possess at elections." 4
6
2. The Larceny Act
Following the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the scope of
the commerce power in the Lottery Case, it was but a short step for
Congress to federalize an offense if the criminal activity took place in
interstate commerce or in direct connection with goods actually mov-
ing in interstate commerce. As a constitutional matter, the necessary
and proper clause47 enabled Congress to protect commercial inter-
course among the states by enacting laws that would define and pun-
ish criminal interference with the interstate shipment of goods. The
first enactment of this type of criminal statute was in 1913 in the Lar-
ceny Act,48 which prohibited larceny from railroad cars containing
interstate or foreign shipments.
Constitutional and practical problems arose, however, in that the
Larceny Act made "an ordinary crime, which was previously cogni-
zable only in a state court, a federal offense merely because the crime
was committed in interstate commerce or in connection with an article
moving in interstate commerce. 49  This was a "departure from the
earlier principles of federal criminal legislation, and affected the basic
distribution of powers between state and nation" because it "was a
43. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
44. Id. at 189-90.
45. Id. at 196.
46. Id. at 197.
47. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
48. Larceny Act, ch. 50, §1, 37 Stat. 670 (1913) (codified at IF; U.S.C § 2117 (1976)), The
Larceny Act provides in part:
Whoever breaks the seal or lock of any railroad car, vessel . . . or other vehicle or of
any pipeline system, containing interstate or foreign shipments of freight or express
or other property, or enters any such vehicle or pipeline system with intent in either
case to commit larceny therein, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2117 (1976).
49. Boudin, supra note 5, at 267.
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practical invasion of a sphere of competence long enjoyed exclusively
by the states."50 Previous federal laws prohibiting the criminal use of
an instrumentality of interstate commerce did not prohibit activities
that were already state law crimes.5' Congress accordingly attempted
to minimize the intrusion of the federal government into an area of
substantive state law by providing in the Larceny Act that
nothing in this Act shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction
of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof; and a judgment
of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall
be a bar to any prosecution hereunder for the same act or acts.52
The Larceny Act, therefore, was consistent with the view that the fed-
eral role would vindicate the federal interest of protecting interstate
commerce, but at the same time would recognize the states' interest
in protecting their citizens from crimes of larceny.53 Moreover, it
indicated a congressional determination that the federal interest was
not so substantial that it warranted federal prosecution in all cases; if
the state prosecuted the larceny of interstate shipments, federal pro-
secution was barred.
The language quoted above from the Larceny Act illustrates a sig-
nificant point: under this piecemeal approach to federal criminal legis-
lation Congress limited the federal prosecution of state law crimes to
the extent deemed necessary on an offense-by-offense basis.5 4 Federal
interests would be protected by both state and federal law, but the
principal responsibility for punishing the proscribed conduct remained
with the states.
3. Post- World War I
Significant expansion in the coverage of federal criminal laws
enacted under the commerce power occurred after World War I as Con-
gress continued to respond on an offense-by-offense basis to the pres-
sures for federal criminal legislation. The increase in federal juris-
diction over crime in these years has been explained in part as necessary
because "state power proved increasingly inadequate to deal with crime
extending beyond state borders."55 The primary difficulties in state law
enforcement in this era were related to the advent of the automobile and
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Larceny Act, ch. 50, § 2, 37 Stat. 670 (1913) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (1976)).
53. Cf. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847) (recognizing that the State of Ohio had an
interest in protecting its citizens from the private wrong that occurs when one passes counterfeit
coins to another, even though the federal government has the power under the Constitution to
punish offenses related to counterfeiting).
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
55. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAvs, STUDY DRAr OF
A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE xxviii (1970).
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increasing mobility of American society, accompanied by a correspond-
ing increase in the interstate operations of organized crime.56
For example, when theft rings were organized to transport stolen
vehicles across state lines and arrange the resale of the vehicles, diffi-
culties in coordinating investigatory and prosecutorial efforts among the
states contributed to Congress' decision in 1919 to make it a federal
crime to transport or receive stolen motor vehicles in interstate com-
merce. 57  In Brooks v. United States?8 the Court applied the principles
of the Lottery Case and Hoke in sustaining the National Motor Ve-
hicle Theft Act as a valid congressional exercise of the police power
"within the field of interstate commerce." 59
Similarly, as roads and railroads were expanded and improved in
these years it became easier for fugitives to flee from justice. The
Fugitive Felon Act of 1934 made it "unlawful for any person to move or
travel in interstate .. .commerce .. .with intent . .. to avoid pro-
secution for murder, kidnaping, burglary, robbery, mayhem, rape,
assault with a dangerous weapon, or extortion accompanied by threats
of violence."60 The public outcry over the kidnaping of the Lindbergh
child provided the impetus for. the so-called Lindbergh Law, which
punished "whoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported
. .. in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who shall have been
unlawfully seized, confined, . ..kidnaped, abducted, or carried away
by any means whatsoever and held for ransom or reward or other-
wise . .. ,,6 1 As a result of this period of development of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction, it was no longer open to question that the plenary
power of Congress under the commerce clause enabled it to prohibit the
use of interstate facilities in aid of criminal enterprise.
4. Jurisdiction as an Element of the Federal Offense
Throughout the early development of federal criminal legislation
both Congress and the federal courts continually considered the juris-
dictional violation-i.e.,that element of the criminal conduct that vio-
lated or impinged a federal interest-an essential element of the federal
offense.62 Federal statutes stated the basis for exercising federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction together with the definitions of criminal conduct as an
56. See Note, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 805, 806.
57. The resulting statute was the National Motor Vehicle Theft (Dyer) Act, ch. 89. §§ 1. 3-5.
41 Stat. 324, 325 (1919) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13 (1976)).
58. 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
59. Id. at 436-37.
60. Fugitive Felon Act, ch. 302, 48 Stat. 782 (1934) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976)),
61. Federal Kidnaping Act, ch. 271, §§ 1, 3, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (current version at 18 U.SC.
1201 (1976)).
62. See, e.g., Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976); Davidson v. United States. 61 F.2d 250,
254-55 (8th Cir. 1932).
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element of the offense.63  Most current federal criminal statutes still
follow this approach" because of congressional
recognition of the limited nature of the powers granted the federal
government by the Constitution. The philosophical rationale for such
a formulation of offenses is that the Federal government should take
cognizance only of the harm to its integrity, imposing criminal sanc-
tions only to the extent that misconduct obstructs a specific federal
function and leaving punishment for the misconduct itself to State
65and local governments.
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
A. Continued Application of Traditional Principles
1. The Anti-Extortion Act
In the wake of the Great Depression the new presence of the fed-
eral government was felt not only in socioeconomic legislation, but in a
continued expansion of federal criminal legislation. These laws con-
tinued to build on the principles established in the Lottery Case and
were drafted to include the jurisdictional violation as an element of the
federal offense. In 1934, Congress used the commerce power to create
two new jurisdictional bases that were to require judicial interpretation
to delineate their actual jurisdictional reach.
The first new jurisdictional base was contained in the Anti-Extor-
tion Act, which made it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce, by
any means whatsoever, any threat to injure or kidnap any person with
intent to extort any money or thing of value.66 It was not clear whether
the jurisdictional language of the Anti-Extortion Act-transmit in inter-
state commerce-required that the transmission move from one state to
another state, or whether a purely intrastate communication nonethe-
less could be a threat transmitted in interstate commerce. In general,
the response by the courts was that the threat must cross state lines.' 7
Thus, the communication of a threat by means of telephone that did not
cross state lines did not satisfy the jurisdictional element under the
63. For example, the Dyer Act punished whoever knowingly received a stolen motor vehicle
"moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce. " 18 U.S.C.
§ 2313 (1976).
64. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
65. Id. Nonetheless the punishment that is imposed for violation of a federal interest does
in fact reflect the nature of the underlying criminal conduct. For example, one %%ho violates the
federal interest in regulating the avenues of interstate commerce by transporting a kidnap victim
across state line faces more severe penalties under the law than one who violates the same federal
interest by shipping lottery tickets interstate. Compare Federal Kidnaping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201
(1976) with Lottery Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-05 (1976).
66. Anti-Extortion Act, ch. 300, 48 Stat. 781 (1934) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1976)).
67. See United States v. Oxendine, 531 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Holder,
302 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mont. 1969), qaf'd, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 502 (3d Cir. 1973) (telephone call must be interstate to satisfy similar
jurisdictional language of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976)).
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statute merely because "the nation's vast network of telephone lines
constitutes interstate commerce.,
68
2. The Hobbs Act
A second, more significant, jurisdictional base was created in 1934
with the passage of the first federal anti-racketeering statute,
69
amended by the Hobbs Act in 1946.70 The Hobbs Act at present pro-
vides in part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens phys-
ical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose
to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.7'
When this broad jurisdictional language first appeared in 1934 the
suggestion was made that the statute should be construed to "limit its
operation to crimes in which interstate or foreign commerce was used in
the perpetration of the offense or in achieving its purpose. 7 2  This
suggestion was not followed in Stirone v. United States,73 in which the
Supreme Court construed the Hobbs Act as "manifesting a purpose to
use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference
with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence. 74
The Act was held not to be limited to conduct that directly and immedi-
ately obstructs a particular movement of goods in interstate commerce;
criminal extortion or racketeering that produces only an indirect effect
on interstate commerce could be sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction
over the offense. 75 Nonetheless, in Stirone the Court continued to em-
phasize that the existence of federal jurisdiction was a crucial element
of a Hobbs Act offense:
68. United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296, 298 (D. Mont. 1969), afi'd, 427 F.2d 715
(9th Cir. 1970).
69. Anti-Racketeering Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, §§ 1-6, 48 Stat. 979, as amended by 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
70. Hobbs Act, ch. 537, §§ 1-6, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)),
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976).
72. Boudin, supra note 5, at 284-85.
73. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
74. Id. at 215. In United States v. Culbert, 98 S. Ct. 1112 (1978), the Court reaffirmed
Stirone when it resolved a split in the circuit courts by refusing to read a "racketeering" require.
ment into the statute. In Culbert the Court construed the legislative history of the Hobbs Act
to indicate that "Congress apparently believed . . . that the States had not been effectively
prosecuting robbery and extortion affecting interstate commerce and that the Federal Government
had an obligation to do so." Id. at 1117. This construction of the statute enabled the Court
to sustain Culbert's conviction in the District Court, which had been reversed by the Ninth Circuit,
for attempting to obtain $100,000 from a federally-insured bank by means of threats of physical
violence made to the bank's president.
75. 361 U.S. at 215. See United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir, 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
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Here . . . there are two essential elements of a Hobbs Act crime: inter-
ference with commerce, and extortion. Both elements have to be charged.
Neither is surplusage and neither can be treated as surplusage. The
charge that interstate commerce is affected is critical since the Federal
Government's jurisdiction of this crime rests only on that interference. 7'
3. Recent Legislation
The principle that Congress has the power to criminalize conduct
that uses interstate or foreign commerce facilities for unlawful pur-
poses was applied as the constitutional basis for the enactment in the
1960's of legislation that was directed against the operations of organ-
ized crime.77 Much of the legislation was aimed at combatting large
scale illegal gambling that operated across state lines. 78 The Travel
Act in particular has proved of significant assistance in fulfilling this
role.79  Only the federal loan shark statute,80 however, expanded the
reach of federal criminal jurisdiction based on the commerce power to
purely intrastate activity, and thus differed significantly from previous
federal criminal statutes by not requiring any proof of an interstate
nexus as a basis for federal jurisdiction."s This expansion was upheld
in Perez v. United States,82 in which the Supreme Court adopted the
principle that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
extends to local criminal activity that affects interstate commerce. This
is the most recent and perhaps far-reaching development in federal
criminal jurisdiction,8 3 and in order to better understand the Court's
holding in Perez, a brief discussion of the modern scope of the com-
merce power concerning economic and noneconomic regulation follows.
B. Federalization of Intrastate Crime: From Wickard v. Filburn to
Perez v. United States84
76. 361 U.S. at 218. Concerning the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act offense of
extortion under color of right, the circuit courts have endorsed a policy of expanding the inter-
state nexus to include within the reach of federal power criminal acts that potentially affect
commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
837 (1975). See generally Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Studj' in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171 (1977).
77. See Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976); see generally Kennedy, The Program of the
Department of Justice on Organized Crime, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWV. 637 (1963); Pollner, Attorney
General Robert F. kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering,
28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 37 (1961); Note, supra note 56, at 812-14.
78. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1955 (1976).
79. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 839.
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1976).
81. See text accompanying notes 99-104 infra.
82. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
83. See Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime,
15 ARIZ. L. REv. 271 (1973).
84. Id. The analysis in this section draws extensively from the article by Mr. Stern.
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1. Plenary Power and Federal Regulation of Local
Economic Activity
It was not until the Supreme Court upheld New Deal legislation in
the midst of the controversy over President Roosevelt's court-packing
plan in 1937 that the full implications of Congress' plenary power under
the commerce clause, as articulated in Gibbons v. Ogden," could be
realized.86 After 1937 it was soon established that the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce included the power to regulate
local, intrastate economic activity that either directly or indirectly
affects interstate commerce.87 Perhaps the most startling application
of this principle occurred in Wickard v. Filburn," in which the Supreme
Court sustained federal marketing quotas on wheat production as
applied to an individual farmer who grew wheat in excess of the quotas
even though the farmer consumed the excess on his farm. In Wickard
the Court reasoned that the home-grown wheat supplied "a need of the
man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in
the open market," and thus competed with wheat in commerce.89 In
determining that the farmer's activity affected commerce, the Court
considered the total impact on commerce of the class of all home wheat
growers: "That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."9  This
rationale echoed what the Court had decided one year earlier in United
States v. Darby,91 in which the Court also stated that in passing on the
validity of legislation in which "Congress itself has said that a particular
activity affects the commerce, . . . the only function of courts is to de-
termine whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is within
the reach of the federal power.
92
2. Application of Wickard and Darby to Noneconomic Commerce
Clause Legislation: The Public Accommodation Cases
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See text accompanying notes 13-46 supra.
86. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See generally Stern,
The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946);
for a discussion of the court-packing plan see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D, SHAPIRO, & H. WEltC-
SLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 41-45 (2d cd.
1973).
87. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I1l (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
88. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
89. Id. at 128.
90. Id. at 127-28.
91. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
92. Id. at 120-21. But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(striking down commerce clause legislation that operated to impair the ability of the states as
states to allocate limited resources and function effectively as employers).
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A The rationales of Darby and Wickard facilitated further congres-
sional exercise of its plenary power under the commerce clause, and the
principles of those cases have since been applied to commerce clause
legislation involving noneconomic regulation. In Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States93 and Katzenbach v. McClung4 the Su-
preme Court followed the import of Darby and Wickard when it sus-
tained the power of Congress under the commerce clause to enact civil
rights legislation making it unlawful for places of public accommoda-
tion to refuse to serve travelers or patrons on the basis of race.
In these two cases the Court adopted a number of theories to
sustain the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9'
The prohibition of racial discrimination by a hotel that received inter-
state travelers was directed at a practice that inhibited interstate
movement hnd thereby had a disruptive effect on commercial inter-
course.9 6 The prohibition of discrimination was extended to restau-
rants, for if restaurants sold fewer interstate goods as a result of the
discrimination, interstate travel was -obstructed, business in general
suffered, and new businesses refrained from establishing in areas where
discrimination was practiced. In this way the Court reasoned that
it was constitutional for Congress to consider the total effect on com-
merce of the discriminatory practices of a great many individual pro-
prietors, each of whom may individually have had an insubstantial effect
on interstate commerce. This reasoning reaffirmed the power of Con-
gress to regulate under the "class of activities" test, that is, "the power
. .. to regulate acts which in isolation have no significant effect on
interstate commerce but which were part of a class which as a whole
could be said to have such an effect."98
3. Perez v. United States and its Aftermath
A major development in the growth of federal criminal jurisdiction
occurred when the Supreme Court, in Perez v. United States,99 sus-
tained the power of Congress to regulate intrastate crime under the
commerce clause "class of activities" test that had been applied in the
public accommodation cases. In Perez the Court had before it a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the federal loan shark statute,100 which
prohibited all extortionate credit transactions whether or not an inter-
93. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
94. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
96. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
97. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).
98. Stem, supra note 83, at 272-73.
99. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1976).
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state connection was established for any particular transaction.101 The
loan shark statute did not require "any proof of interstate movement,
of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts showing
that [an accused's] conduct affected commerce."' 0 2  Nonetheless the
Court held that Congress could exercise criminal jurisdiction over a
purely intrastate extortionate credit transaction because Congress had
found that the class of all extortionate credit transactions supplied a
major source of revenue to organized crime and adversely affected
interstate commerce. The Court accepted as "quite adequate" the
congressional findings that there was a tie-in between local loan sharks
and interstate crime;10 3 it agreed with Congress that the economic,
financial, and social setting of the problem of loan sharking indicated
that federal regulation was necessary to arrest a problem of national
dimensions.'04 Thus, Congress could appropriately consider the total
impact of the practice of the class of loan sharks on commerce.
The Perez holding, though a major development, was not revolu-
tionary, for the Court had indicated nearly two decades earlier that
it would uphold congressional regulation of an entire class of criminal
transactions within the interstate commerce context. In United States
v. Five Gambling Devices,'0 5 what has been termed the "first partial
step" in the federalization of intrastate crime occurred.1 6  There six
of the Justices subscribed to the view that interpreted reporting pro-
visions of a federal statute prohibiting the interstate transportation
of gambling machines to apply also to intrastate transactions as a
means reasonably necessary to effectuate the prohibition of transport-
ing gambling devices interstate. 0 7  This interpretation of the federal
regulation, however, was limited to the particular evil sought to be
eradicated in Gambling Devices: "[T]he situation here is unique: the
commodity involved is peculiarly tied to organized interstate crime and
is itself illegal in the great majority of the States, and the federal law
101. An extortionate credit transaction is the lending of money at exorbitant rates of interest
followed by the use of violence or threats of violence as a means of collecting on the loans,
102. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (Stewart, ., dissenting).
103. 402 U.S. at 155. Moreover, it was uncontrovcrted that Perez was a member of the
class of loan sharks who engage in extortionate credit transactions. Id. at 153.
104. "It appears . . . that loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized crime
holds its guns to the heads of the poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from numerous
localities to finance its national operations." 402 U.S. at 157.
105. 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
106. Stern, supra note 83, at 274-76.
107. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 463 (1953) (Clark, J.,
dissenting). In a plurality opinion, however, the Court sustained the dismissal of indictments
that charged two dealers with failure to comply with the reporting provisions regarding slot
machines seized by federal agents from a local club. Three of the Justices construed the statute
as not reaching purely intrastate transactions; the two concurring Justices agreed with the dis-
sent that Congress had the power to require registration of all gambling machines and that the
statute applied to all transactions, interstate or intrastate, but that the registration requirements
were unconstitutionally vague.
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in issue was actively sought by local and state law enforcement officials
as a means to assist them."108  The Perez opinion similarly empha-
sized the role of organized crime in loan sharking activities; indeed,
Congress acted on the presumption that the loan shark statute would
"get at" the operations of organized crime. As a result, the decision
in Perez has been explained as a product of
the difficulty in proving in each individual case that the loan shark had
an interstate connection even when it existed. A sweeping prohibition
may, therefore, have been the only, or at least the most effective, means
of combatting an interstate evil-even though a particular episode may
have no effect upon or relation to interstate commerce whatsoever.'"
Because the Perez majority employed the commerce clause class
of activities test, however, the implications of the case may be much
broader than a reading that limits it to the activities of organized crime
would indicate. Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter in Perez, pointed
this out:
It is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for
all crime is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan
sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an inter-
state setting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse
impact on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for inter-
state business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting
or violence on the streets. 10
Indeed, commentators have questioned how far the class of activ-
ities rationale of Perez can be extended in federal criminal statutes
without making a major intrusion into the area of local law enforce-
ment.11' One commentator has suggested that "Congress is unlikely
to interject the federal government into local transactions without good
reason" 1 2 and that practical restraints would limit federal intervention
in local law enforcement to areas in which both federal and state gov-
ernments seek to effectuate the same policies." 3  Such restraints
would mean that the Court may never "face an exercise of federal
power over local crimes unless substantial local benefit from having
the national government deal with the problem can be established.""
4
108. 346 U.S. at 463.
109. Stem, supra note 83, at 278. See also 49 TEx. L. REv. 568, 573 (1971).
110. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
111. See Stem, supra note 83, at 280-85; 49 Tx. L. REv. 1106, 1111 (1971). The impact or
Perez is especially significant if it means that "Congress may by legislative fact-finding create
the conditions of its own rightful exercise of authority." Schwartz, Preface to Symposium-
Pivotal Decisions of the Supreme Court, 15 ARM L. REv. 224, 226 (1973).
112. Stern, supra note 83, at 280.
113. Id. at 282. Other statutes that have been enacted on a jurisdictional foundation
similar to the loan shark statute also purport to regulate problems of national dimensions.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-45 (1970) (prohibiting distribution of controlled substances).
114. Stern, supra note 83, at 283-84.
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There has been some indication of the judiciary's reluctance to
allow federal criminal jurisdiction to grow unchecked, for in three re-
latively recent decisions the Supreme Court has limited the application
of federal criminal statutes enacted under the commerce power.
15
In these cases the Court has neither restricted Perez nor articulated
any new constitutional standard; rather, it haE limited the federal
presence in the fight against local crime by construing federal statutes
narrowly in accordance with the rule of strict construction'" 6 and by
refusing to extend federal criminal jurisdiction into areas traditionally
policed by the states unless Congress clearly conveyed its purpose to
significantly change the "federal-state balance." 1 7
C. Modern Federal Criminal Jurisdiction: An Overview
The present scope of federal jurisdiction over criminal activities
is a far cry from what Madison and Hamilton had envisioned as the
proper role of the federal government. Yet this growth is not without
its logic and justification. The growth of federal criminal jurisdiction
occurred in piecemeal fashion as federal criminal statutes were passed
to meet the exigencies of contemporary national problems. Each
new expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction sought to maintain
the delicate state-federal balance that is viewed as a cornerstone of
our federalist system. The federal government moved into an area
only when the states-because of the nature of the activity or their own
lack of resources-demonstrated an inability to deal effectively with a
certain criminal activity. In this manner the federal criminal system
served in an auxiliary capacity in those areas that were traditionally
of state concern. The states were free to assert local interests and
use the flexibility inherent in a locally-based system in the fight against
crime. It was only when the proportions of the criminal activity be-
came "national" in character that the federal government stepped in.
Given the piecemeal character of the development of federal
criminal jurisdiction, it was perhaps inevitable that Congress would
115. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); Unit:d States v. Bass, 404 U.S,
336 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971). See also Erlenbaugh v. United States,
409 U.S. 239, 247 (1972). Two very recent cases suggest that the Court may be moving the other
way. See United States v. Culbert, 98 S. Ct. 1112 (1978); Scarboiough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563 (1977).
116. "[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor
of lenity." Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). The pr neiple of strict construction
is founded on two policies that have long been associated with federal criminal law. The first is
that "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed." MeBoyle v. United States,
283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.). The second is that "because of the seriousness of criminal
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity." United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
117. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
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eventually attempt to revise and consolidate the federal criminal sys-
tem. Those to whom the task would fall might reflect on the develop-
ment of federal criminal jurisdiction and conclude that the role of the
federal government was primary in areas of federal concern but auxil-
iary in areas in which the federal interest overlapped with local inter-
ests. In this manner the federal-state balance of federalism could
be preserved and each sovereign could direct its limited resources to
the areas in which it would be most effective. The drafters of the
Proposed Federal Criminal Code, however, evidently had something
else in mind.
III. TREATMENT OF JURISDICTION IN THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
A. The Structure of the Proposed Federal Offense
In the operation of the Proposed Code, federal offenses have been
restructured to de-emphasize the importance of the jurisdictional
factor to the federal offense. The de-emphasis in jurisdiction has been
carried out by separating the jurisdictional violation from the under-
lying offense and, as a corollary, by providing a per se rule that the
existence of federal jurisdiction is not an element of the federal of-
fense,' l8 and thus not an issue of fact for the jury." 9 This treatment
of jurisdiction departs from the historical pattern and would open the
way for the federal government to assume a primary enforcement role
over activities of local concern.
The separation of the jurisdictional element from the underlying
offense departs from current laws that in general have been drafted
to include the jurisdictional factor as an element of the federal of-
fense. 120  The rationale for inclusion of a jurisdictional element in the
definition of the crime is the recognition of the limited powers over
crime granted the federal government under the Constitution. 121 Only
in rare instances, such as with the federal loan shark statute, did
Congress define criminal activity without providing for a jurisdictional
basis as an element of the federal offense.'
22
The drafters of the Proposed Code believe, however, that "[n]oth-
ing has so distorted Federal criminal law as the legislative practice of
defining Federal crimes in such a way as to make jurisdictional re-
quirements an element of the offense. This confuses the conduct
118. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 201(c).
119. Id. tit. II, § 111 (o)(b)(1) (proposed FED. R. CRIM. P.25. 1). Under this provision the judge
will determine the existence of jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt.
120, See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
121. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
122. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
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proscribed with the Federal power to prohibit the conduct."' 3 Thus,
the drafters have divorced the question of what constitutes criminal
conduct from the question of what criminal behavior triggers federal
jurisdiction. 124  The architects of the reform bill have defined federal
offenses only in terms prohibiting the objectionable activity. They
have separated the jurisdictional violation from the elements of the
underlying offense, detailing separately, in the jurisdictional subsec-
tion of the offense, the circumstances that give rise to federal jurisdic-
tion.12 5  Thus, for example, the current robbery laws 126 have been re-
structured as follows:
§ 1721. Robbery
(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if he takes property of
another from the person or presence of another by force and violence, or
by threatening or placing another person in fear that any person will im-
minently be subjected to bodily injury.
(b) GRADING.-An offense described in this section is a Class C felony.
(C) JURISDICTION.-There is federal jurisdiction over an offense de-
scribed in this section if:
(1) the offense is committed within the special jurisdiction of the
United States;
(2) the property is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control
of, the United States; is being produced, manufactured, constructed,
or stored for the United States; or is subject to a security interest held
by the United States;
(3) the property is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control
of, a national credit institution;
(4) the property is mail;
(5) the offense in any way or degree affects, delays,, or obstructs inter-
state or foreign commerce or the movement of an article or commod-
ity in interstate or foreign commerce;
(6) the property is moving in interstate or foreign commerce, consti-
tutes or is a part of an interstate or foreign shipment, or is in a pipeline
system that extends across a state or United States boundary or in a
storage facility of such a system;
(7) movement of a person across a state or United States boundary
occurs in the planning, promotion, management, execution, consum-
mation, or concealment of the offense, or in the distribution of the pro-
ceeds of the offense;
(8) the offense is committed against:
123. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id. at 30. This approach improves on the more controvers al approach taken in earlier
versions of the Proposed Code. Under the alternative suggested previously by the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, "the jurisdictional ,.ubsection [included] a cross
reference to one or more of several generally stated jurisdictional concepts appearing elsewhere in
the Code." Id. at 31. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1; Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 201.
For criticism of the National Commission's approach see Clark, Prologue, 68 Nw. L. Riv. 817,
817-25 (1973); Levine, The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code: A Constitutional and Jurisdic-
tional Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1972); SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 31-33.
126. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1652, 1661, 1951, 2111-2114 (1976).
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(A) a foreign dignitary, or a member of his immediate family,
who is in the United States;
(B) a foreign official who is in the United States on official business,
or a member of his immediate family who is in the United States in
connection with the visit of such official;
(C) an official guest of the United States, or
(D) an internationally protected person; or
(9) the property is a controlled substance, consisting of a narcotic,
amphetamine, or barbituate, that is listed in Schedules I through IV
established by section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 812) and that has value in excess of $500; the offense consists
of a robbery of a pharmacy; and the offense is part of a pattern of such
robberies in the locality.1
27
The drafters attempt to rationalize this restructuring of current
law by stating that "[]urisdiction is not an element of an offense . . .
because jurisdiction goes only to the power of a government to prose-
cute. Whether or not it is proper for the federal government to prose-
cute is a separate question from whether or not the defendant has
done something criminal."'12 This explanation, however, fails to jus-
tify the proposed per se rule, for historically the question has been
whether the defendant's criminal conduct violated a federal interest.
The federal government's constitutional power to punish crime is as
dependent as ever on the existence of a jurisdictional nexus between
the proscribed conduct and an enumerated federal legislative power.
In many instances, establishing the jurisdictional nexus will involve
establishing facts at trial just as susceptible to offers of conflicting
evidence as the underlying elements of an offense. By this restruc-
turing, the drafters of the Proposed Code have taken the resolution
of these disputed issues of fact from the jury's province of determin-
ing them beyond a reasonable doubt.12 9  This is a most serious devi-
ation from current federal criminal practice and could have major
ramifications in the federal government's ability to successfully move
against an expanded area of criminal activity. Such a change de-
serves more of a justification than "jurisdiction goes only to the power
of the government to prosecute."
Moreover, despite the restructuring, only the jurisdictional factor
127. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1721.
128. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, quoted in SENATE REPORT, stpra note 3, at 40.
129. The existence of jurisdiction is an issue for the judge and must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proposed Code, supra note 2, tit. II, § 11l(o)(b)(l). This, however, could
often involve resolution of issues of fact usually left to the jury in a criminal trial. For cxample. the
proposed theft offense provides in part that there will be federal jurisdiction over theft if the
property involved has a value of S5,000 or more, and is moved across a state or United States
boundary in the commission of the offense. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1731(cX9). Whether
stolen property has a value of S5,000 could involve hotly disputed valuation and evidentiary
problems. Furthermore, whether the property was moved across state lines during the commis-
sion of an offense is a question of fact that could turn on conflicting proof of when and if the
property was moved.
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continues to distinguish the federal offense from analogous state law
provisions dealing with the same conduct. The greater ease that fed-
eral prosecutors will have in asserting federal lurisdiction will tend
to blur this distinction between federal and state criminal legislation.
Principles of federalism would seem to dictate that the drafters of
federal criminal law reform give more consideration to the state in-
terests and not concentrate solely on whether the federal government
might have the power to prosecute. Because of these considerations,
a federal defendant should not, as a per se rule, be denied a jury
determination beyond a reasonable doubt of what may prove to be the
crucial element in a federal prosecution.
B. Expansion in the Jurisdictional Bases
A more serious departure from the historical pattern of federal
criminal legislation is that in the process of restructuring offenses the
drafters of the Proposed Code have also expanded jurisdictional bases
in many instances, thereby in effect creating new federal laws dealing
with crime. The expansion in many instances is so great that it
would place the federal government in a position to assume a primary
enforcement role in matters of purely local concern. Unlike the cir-
cumstances surrounding the piecemeal development of federal criminal
law in the past, there has been no current demonstration of the need
for this expansion. I have designed the following hypothetical situ-
ations to illustrate some of the expansion in the jurisdictional bases
under the Proposed Code.
1. Use of a Facility of Interstate Commerce
A. X, a prostitute, works during the evenings out of a local hotel-bar
in Columbus, Ohio. Each morning she uses a pay phone to call Y, her
pimp, in order to account for her night's business and arrange delivery of
the proceeds to him. There would be federal jurisdiction over Y's
activity, and Y would be guilty of a federal offense.""
B. A, who operates a corner adult bookstore in Miami, Florida, is in-
dicted by a federal grand jury for displaying and distributing for profit
obscene material.13' A obtains the material from B, who operates a ware-
house in Miami. B is also indicted. Because A places his orders for
books with B over the telephone, federal jurisdiction would exist over
the offense of disseminating obscene material.1
32
130. Under the Proposed Code, a person is guilty of conducting a prostitution business
if "he owns, controls, manages, supervises, directs, finances, procures patrons for, or recruits
participants in, a prostitution business." Id. § 1843(a). A "prostitution business" means "a
business in which a person controls, manages, supervises, or directs the prostitution of another
person." Id. § 1843(b)(2). X, the prostitute, may be criminally liable as an accomplice, I. § 401.
131. For the definition of obscene material see id. § 1842(b)(5).
132. Id. § 1842(0(2).
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Neither of these activities constitutes federal offenses under current
law, and it is doubtful that there is a need for federal intervention in
these areas. The Proposed Code brings the federal system into play in
the first situation, however, by providing for federal jurisdiction over
conducting a prostitution business if "the United States mail or a
facility of interstate or foreign commerce is used in the planning, pro-
motion, management, execution, consummation, or concealment of the
offense, or in the distribution of the proceeds of the offense."' 33 Simi-
larly, federal jurisdiction arises over the dissemination of obscene mate-
rial if a facility of interstate commerce is used.134  In both of these
hypothetical situations, intrastate use of a facility of interstate com-
merce (the telephone) would constitute a violation of a federal interest
under the current interpretation of this jurisdictional language. 35 Thus,
this language, as applied in the Proposed Code, subjects to federal pros-
ecution many offenses that have always been considered local in nature.
Such an insignificant demonstration of a federal interest (the mere
use of a telephone) is in sharp contrast to generally prevailing federal
criminal jurisdictional principles, such as the principles developed under
the Anti-Extortion Act, in which courts have held that to be proscribed,
a threat must cross state lines, and that the mere use of a telephone is
not enough to bring the federal system into play. 36 The new provision,
which is also present in the proposed extortion, 37 blackmail, 38 and
gambling sections,1 39 finds it genesis in the Travel Act,1 40 but it is an
expansion from the current interpretation, which prohibits traveling or
using a facility in interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of un-
lawful activities such as gambling or prostitution. 41  By expanding
upon the current understanding of "facilities of interstate commerce,.
the drafters of the Proposed Code have asserted federal jurisdiction
over areas that have traditionally been matters of local concern and in
which there is no demonstrated need for federal substantive regulation.
133. Id. § 1843(e)(2).
134. Id. § 1842(0(2).
135. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1967) (interpreting a jurisdictional
provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976)), cert, denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968). The use of the jurisdictional language of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 seems
particularly misplaced when applied to such minor, local criminal offenses as prostitution and
gambling, offenses that are readily prosecuted under local law and that do not involve interstate
activity.
136. See United States v. Oxendine, 531 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Feudale, 271 F. Supp. 115 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
137. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1722(d)(2).
138. Id. § 1723(d)(1).
139. Id. § 1841(f)(2)(A). It is a defense to the proposed "engaging in a gambling business"
offense that the gambling activity was legal in all states and localities in which it was carried on.
Id. § 1841(c)(1).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
141. Id. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971); United States v. Altobella, 442
F.2d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1971).
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2. Movement Across State Lines
Y, a resident of Chicago, Illinois, participates in a public rally protest-
ing alleged racial discrimination in the hiring policies of the Chicago
police department. The rally takes place near the steps of the police sta-
tion. Z, a friend of Y's who is active in civil rights matters, comes from
Detroit, Michigan to Chicago to participate in the rally. In the course of
the demonstration, Y is directly responsible for the destruction of street
lights outside the station and for the breakage of windows in the building
itself. Y would be guilty of the federal offense of property destruc-
tion, 142 and possibly of aggravated property destruction. r43
The expansion in federal jurisdiction to reach this hypothetical
situation is based on the "movement of a person [Z] across a state or
United States boundary . .. in the planning, promotion, management,
execution, [or] consummation .. .of the offense."' 144 The current law,
however, is confined to the movement of the offender (Y) across state
lines, 1 45 but the travel base in the Proposed Code includes the inter-
state movement of any person in connection with the offense.146 More-
over, new federal crimes have been created in connection with this
jurisdictional base, for the crimes of property destruction or aggravated
property destruction in the hypothetical situation are not federal
offenses under the current law.147  Thus, in this particular hypothetical
situation jurisdictional expansion has been accompanied by expansion
in the coverage of the substantive federal criminal law dealing with
offenses involving property. The increased mobility of American
society together with the expansive reach of this jurisdictional base
would subject many persons to possible federal prosecution for crimes
against property lying solely within a state's boundaries, an area that
has always been viewed as a matter of local concern. This proposed
jurisdictional provision regarding movement of any person across state
lines in connection with the offense has also been inserted in the pro-
posed robbery,1 48 extortion, 49 blackmail, 150 gambling, 151 and prostitu-
tion152 offenses.
142. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1703.
143. Id. § 1702.
144. Id. § 1701(c)(9).
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
146. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 594 n.25.
147. The only property offense reached under the current Travel Act is arson. See 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
148. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1721(c)(7). The provision also reaches travel across a
state or United States boundary in the concealment of the offense or in the distribution of the
proceeds of the offense.
149. Id. § 1722(d)(1).
150. Id. § 1723(d)(1).
151. Id. § 1841(t)(2)(B).
152. Id. § 1843(e)(3).
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3. The Offense Affects Interstate Commerce
Yholds up at gunpoint a department store in Rutland, Vermont. The
store is one of a chain of national department stores and receives most of
its merchandise from outside Vermont. There would be federal juris-
diction over this robbery, which would be deemed to have obstructed
interstate commerce.1
53
Federal jurisdiction exists over robbery if "the offense in any way
or degree affects, delays, or obstructs interstate or foreign commerce or
the movement of an article or commodity in interstate or foreign com-
merce."'154 In light of the recent decision in United States v. Culbert,'"
this provision probably represents no change in the scope of federal
power over local robbery. The provision, however, has been extended
under the Proposed Code to reach blackmail.
156
4. Piggyback Jurisdiction
A. In the course of the robbery of a department store a cashier is
shot by the robber and dies from the resulting wounds. There would be
federal jurisdiction over the robbery' 57 and the federal felony murder
offense 1 through the technique of piggyback jurisdiction. 59
B. Y and Z plan to rob a truck that is transporting copper between
Pittsburgh and Saint Louis. At a truck stop outside of Wheeling, West
Virginia the robbery plan is executed, but in a shoot-out the truck driver is
severely wounded and dies from his injuries. Y and Z are apprehended
at the truck stop by West Virginia State Police. There would be federal
jurisdiction over the attempted robbery,' 60 the conspiracy to commit
robbery,16' and the felony murder of the truck driver. 61
These hypothetical situations demonstrate the expanded use of
ancillary or piggyback jurisdiction, which is a drafting technique provid-
ing for jurisdiction over state law crimes "committed in association with
Federal offenses." 63 The piggyback offense, normally punishable
solely under state law, becomes a separate federal offense that may be
charged and punished by the federal government, as well as by the
state, when it occurs during the commission of an offense over which
153. Id. § 1721(c)(5).
154. Id. In order to satisfy the language of the statute, the cffect on interstate commerce
need only be to a minimal degree. United States v. Shackelford, 494 F.2d 67, 75 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 934 (1974).
155. 98 S. Ct. 1112 (1978).
156. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1723(d)(1).
157. Id. § 1721(c)(5).
158. Id. § 1601(a)(3).
159. Id. § 1601(e)(4).
160. Id. § 1721(c)(6). ("the property is moving in interstate or foreign commerce [or] con-
stitutes or is a part of an interstate or foreign shipment").
161. Id. § 1002(f)(2).
162. Id. § 1601(e)(4).
163. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
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federal jurisdiction exists. There are approximately three hundred such
combinations of piggyback offenses under the Proposed Code, and
nearly all of these represent expansions in jurisdiction. 64  This expan-
sion would indicate a federal intent to assume primary responsibility for
prosecuting "the more important common-law offenses ... that are
most likely to be encountered in the commission of the particular
Federal offenses involved."' 165  In contrast with the historical growth of
federal criminal jurisdiction, however, this proposed expansion of
federal power does not have the justification of being directed at na-
tional problems unsolvable by the state enforcement authorities.
5. Dual State and Federal Prosecutions
X is prosecuted for larceny under state law for allegedly appropriating
property that is moving in interstate commerce, but the jury acquits X on
the merits of the case. The federal government may nonetheless prose-
cute X for the very same act under the proposed federal theft statute.
166
This situation demonstrates an overturning of part of the current
Larceny Act, 167 which provides that "[a] judgment of conviction or
acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any
prosecution under this section for the same act or acts.'"16  The Pro-
posed Code in general intends to allow independent prosecutions of a
defendant for the same conduct by different sovereignties (by a
state and by the United States), 69 and double jeopardy problems are
"left to existing law and prosecutive policies."
70
164. Id. at 35. The Proposed Code's treatment of piggyback jurisdiction is less expansive
than the broad approach of the proposals of the National Commissioni. See FINAL RiLORT, supra
note 1, § 201(b). The National Commission's approach would hav resulted in more than 7500
piggyback combinations. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3. at 35.
165. Id.
166. Proposed Code, supra note 2, § 1731(c)(8).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (1976).
168. Id. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
169. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 51. Under current law a federal prosecution does
not bar a subsequent state prosecution of the same person for the same acts, and a state
prosecution does not bar a federal one. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). Cf. United
States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978) (double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment does
not bar the prosecution of an Indian in a federal district court under the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1976), when he has previously been convicted in a tribal court of a lesser included
offense arising out of the same incident). The basis for this doctrine is that each government is
deemed to have the right to punish conduct offensive to its sovereignty. See Moore v. Illinois,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852), Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847). With increased
federal jurisdiction, howevef, there are many more possible situations in which a defendant will
be subject to both state and federal prosecutions. Such overlapping jurisdiction is perhaps not
sensitive enough to the limited prosecutorial resources of each sovereignty.
170. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 51 n.112. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S.
529 (1960). Under the Petite policy, the Justice Department has taken a general position
against duplicating federal-state prosecutions. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 98 S. Ct.
81 (1977).
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CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Proposed Code proceeded on the assumption
that as a result of the historical development of federal criminal juris-
diction, "the scope of Federal law-making powers vis-a-vis those of the
States is [now] well defined."' 7' Historically, however, the scope of
federal law-making power developed on an offense-by-offense basis.
In nearly every instance the enactment of federal criminal legislation
was in response to a perceived need for federal action in the fight
against crime, and the legislation was generally aimed at problems of
national dimensions. The Proposed Code departs from this historical
pattern. It contains expansions of jurisdictional concepts that devel-
oped piecemeal over the years, but it does this in the absence of any
perceived or articulated need for expansion. The drafters have not
attempted to qualify jurisdictional language so that it could apply only
to circumstances in which a substantial federal interest is at stake or in
which state enforcement authorities are unable to enforce the law.
Thus, new and broader jurisdictional bases for a number of crimes have
been proposed. Finally, to facilitate federal jurisdictional expansion
over crime the Proposed Code presents a conceptual restructuring of the
federal jurisdictional element within the framework of the federal
offense. Together, these changes suggest that the Proposed Code ad-
dresses itself to problems of local, not national, concern and thus would
have an enormous impact on the future course of criminal law.
The recent reaction of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary 2 indicates that concepts of
federalism retain strength in Congress. The idea of reform and con-
solidation of federal criminal law retains validity, but such reform must
be based on the lessons derived from the history of the development of
federal criminal jurisdiction. Thus, there should be federal prohibition
of those criminal activities that directly impinge on a federal interest or
that demand a national solution. On matters of local concern, how-
ever, the federal government should defer to the traditional power of
the states.
Richard H. Brody
171. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
172. See note 4 supra.
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